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 Increased international standardization by the private sector results from an ever- increasing 
demand of consumers for better and safer products, technological advances, the expansion 
of global trade and the ever- increasing focus on social and sustainability issues. 2 International 
standards affect our everyday life in multiple ways. Standards bring about and solidify techno-
logical evolution, innovation and diffusion of knowledge. In that respect, they have an important 
impact on consumer wellbeing. They play a decisive role as to whether the business and market 
environment will be conducive to increased innovation and trade. They form an important con-
dition for doing business and affect access to markets, determining the profi tability, growth and 
ultimately the survival of entrepreneurs and economic operators alike. Hence, standards have a 
crucial  trade facilitation function . 
 1  This chapter builds heavily on a previous version that appeared in Delimatsis (2015). Several colleagues have 
infl uenced my thinking on standardization- related issues, including Alessandra Arcuri, Axel Marx, Petros Mavroidis, 
Jens Pr ü fer, Charles Sabel, Harm Schepel, Florian Sch ü tt and Jan Wouters. For its research on competition, stand-
ardization and innovation, TILEC has received funding from Qualcomm Inc., which is gratefully acknowledged. 
The research on which this article is based was conducted in accordance with the rules set out in the Royal Dutch 
Academy of Sciences (KNAW) Declaration of Scientifi c Independence. Any remaining errors or misconceptions are 
the author’s alone. 
 2  Egan  2001 . 
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 Yet, standards can also be adopted with a view to restricting access to a given market, thereby 
neutralizing any trade concessions made in other fora, including the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) or preferential trade agreements (PTAs). When standards are very diverse and are 
applied in a thoughtless manner, trade is negatively affected and economies of scale become 
more diffi cult to attain. For small entrepreneurs in particular, the costs of compliance with 
this heterogeneous set of standards may be prohibitive, de facto precluding any possibility for 
gaining access to foreign markets. 3 
 As standards can potentially constitute impactful ‘behind- the- border’ (so- called non- tariff) 
technical barriers that nullify trade concessions and distort the expectations of traders, the WTO 
takes a clear stance in favour of the creation of and adherence to international standards. Already 
the preamble of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) commences with 
an orthodox assumption, that is, that international standards improve effi ciency of production 
and facilitate the conduct of international trade. 4 
 However, the WTO has no capacity or expertise that would allow it to set technical standards. 
In addition, the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter, the TBT Committee) 
does not develop nor adopt standards itself. Rather, as exemplifi ed already by its preamble, 
the TBT exerts a high level of deference towards technical rationality as expressed through 
international standard- setting activities  outside the WTO. Indeed, standards developed within 
international standard- setting organizations (SSOs) acquire a prominent role within the WTO 
through the very text of the TBT. The latter not only requires that WTO Members use ‘relevant 
international standards’ but also presumes compliance with the TBT when such standards are 
used as a basis for domestic technical regulations. 
 Is this regulatory outsourcing justifi ed? The answer is not so trivial, in particular when one 
considers the consequences of such outsourcing. Arguably, it essentially suggests that certain 
non- WTO rules still are WTO- compatible as long as they are relevant to the product at issue in a 
WTO dispute; and this regardless of the process that led to their adoption (which process, by the 
way, is totally out of the control of the WTO). Quite astonishingly, the TBT entails such dele-
gation of regulatory power 5 without any inquiry as to the actual processes used throughout the 
development of international technical standards. This is even more surprising if one considers 
that such delegation of international standard- setting activities relates to private actors active in 
the creation of standards. 
 This constellation brings to the forefront the importance of procedural guarantees within 
international SSOs, notably with regard to representation of varying interests and opportunities 
for participation offered to all WTO Members. However, our knowledge about the mechanics of 
international standard- setting is relatively limited at best and a black box in certain cases. 
 The vantage point of this chapter is that such deferential approach adopted by the WTO is 
untenable. Attributing to international standards developed elsewhere automatic legal force in 
the WTO may clash with contemporary demands for more transparency and due process within 
global governance institutions, more generally, and openness in international standard- setting, 
in particular. 6 It can also give the wrong signals to international SSOs which have become the 
global standard- setters in certain categories of products and services. The key argument of the 
chapter is that the WTO can play an instrumental role in improving standard- setting processes 
 3  Messerlin  2001 . 
 4  Swann et al.  1996 , 1297– 1313. 
 5  For a similar observation under the SPS, see B ü the ( 2008 , 219). 
 6  Cf. Von Bogdandy  2012 , 315. 
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within international SSOs, because its very foundational treaty (and the TBT in particular 
through the presumption of WTO compatibility we mentioned earlier) makes it a prominent 
promoter of such standards and indeed a high- level diffusion mechanism. The chapter argues 
that, due to its powerful dispute resolution system, the WTO can become a potential drive 
for change in transnational standard- setting.  Section B describes the nature of international 
standards, tilting between public and private, in a grey area of law, whereas Section C analyses 
the position of international standards and the bodies that create them from a positive and nor-
mative viewpoint. Section D concludes. 
 A.  DECIPHERING THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 
 1.  Informal, Voluntary and Yet Infl uential as ever 
 Standard- setting resembles law- making, as standards, like laws, are the outcome of discus-
sion, bargaining, deliberation and compromise among non- state actors. 7 However, standards 
established by international SSOs such as the ISO are not law per se, but rather serve a clear 
regulatory function prescribing rules for others to follow. 8 An important distinction, again, is 
that, whereas domestic standardization can encompass both binding and voluntary technical 
specifi cations and standards, international standardization, as noted previously, typically involves 
standards with which compliance is voluntary. Once international standards are adopted, it is 
a country’s prerogative to adopt these standards in the form of domestic technical regulations 
(compliance with which is mandatory), or as standards (compliance with which is optional). 
Depending on the domestic constitutional structures, such standards may be adopted through 
the relevant national standard- setting bodies or public regulatory agencies. A third option for a 
country is to maintain or adopt its own standards or allow for some leeway to domestic com-
panies to decide as to whether they would like to comply voluntarily with the international 
standards at stake. 9 
 Standards, no matter how well- crafted, can interfere with market access. This is mainly 
because standards refl ect domestic preferences and values, which may diverge, thereby infl ating 
compliance costs and values for companies. 10 It is then compliance costs which corroborate the 
case for the development of international standards. Indeed, if developed internationally, then 
substantial gains can be made through the diminution of such costs and by addressing network 
externalities and information asymmetries. Thus, taking into account pure effi ciency consider-
ations, the locus of standardization is to be found outside national borders. 11 
 With the emergence of global supply chains, the importance of international standards 
increases, suggesting that compatibility standards of high quality can yield substantial network 
effects that can make such standards self- enforcing. 12 However, the reduction of compliance 
costs may be only a long- term effect, as, in the short run, the effect of international standards 
may vary in that compliance costs will rise for some fi rms, as the new standard used may be more 
sophisticated. At the same time, an international standard, the theory suggests, would lead to the 
diminution of consumer costs due to better information and the possibility to compare prices. 13 
  7  Cf. Kingsbury et al.  2005 , 15. 
  8  See also Black  2009 , 246. 
  9  See Nakagawa  2011 , 109. 
 10  Staiger & Sykes  2011 , 149. 
  11  B ü the & Mattli  2003 , 1. 
 12  WEF  2012 . 
 13  See WTO  2012c , 136. 
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 Standards constitute a form of codifi ed technical knowledge that enables the development 
of products and processes. Standards regularize and constrain behaviour (regulative function); 
lend a taken- for- granted quality to certain technologies and  modi operandi (cognitive function); 
and favour cooperative strategies over adversarial ones (normative function). 14 In the absence of 
standards, technological progress would lack an important instrument for benchmarking and 
capitalizing on advances in the fi eld of technology. In addition, fi rst- mover advantages in stand-
ardization are substantial incentives for fi rms to innovate. 15 In that sense, standards are essen-
tial enabling components of any functioning market and a decisive instrument for economic 
growth. 16 For instance, studies in France, Germany or the UK have shown that the impact of 
standards on growth can range between 0.3 and 0.9 of national GDP. 17 
 Contextually, international standardization is part of the undisputed rise in transnational law-
making, as SSOs become more private actor- driven. Such transnational regimes have often 
evolved in a vacuum, avoiding any frontal confrontation with State law. In the case of standard- 
setting at the international level, whereas there are private- driven SSOs, in practice state- driven 
actors such as regulators or government- sponsored bodies may develop partnerships  – be it 
formal or informal – with private actors to generate what can be termed ‘informal law’. It is 
not only the informal character of the actors, but informality extends to the output of SSOs as 
well: Whereas domestic standardization can encompass both binding and voluntary technical 
standards and specifi cations, international standardization typically involves standards with 
which compliance is  voluntary . 
 2.  Certain Traits of SSOs 
 As there are manifold technological approaches, an SSO offers a forum where competitors 
and competing vested interests can learn from each other as to the best available technologies 
but also resolve confl icts and coordination problems. In practice, SSOs serve as an important 
information- and knowledge- sharing forum with mutual learning occurring among participants; 
crucial laboratories for the preparation of standards based on a chosen or dominant technology 
and certifi cation checkpoints of those standards at the post- development stage; and, fi nally, 
as instrumental regulators on the use of those standards, for instance, when it comes to the 
licensing of the standardized technology. 18 
 Generally, international SSOs choose consensus as the decision- making mode  par excellence , 
which the ISO defi nes as ‘general agreement, characterized by the absence of  sustained oppos-
ition to  substantial issues by  any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that 
involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any 
confl icting arguments’ (emphasis added). However, it is made clear that consensus need not 
imply unanimity. 19 In other SSOs of private nature, a stricter view with respect to the meaning 
of consensus may be adopted also to increase the legitimacy of processes. 
 14  Lane  1997 , 197. 
 15  Again, and more generally, if we consider standardization as infrastructure, it can promote but also hamper innov-
ation.  See also Acemoglu et al.  2012 , 570. 
 16  Blind & Jungmittag  2008 , 51. 
 17  See European Commission  2016a , 4. 
 18  See Lerner & Tirole  2015 , 547– 548. 
 19  See ISO/ IEC Dir 1, clause 2.5.6. This defi nition is generally accepted as refl ecting the understanding of what con-
sensus entails in standard- setting bodies.  See also EU Regulation 1025/ 2012, Annex II, para. 3(b). 
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 Although unanimity is not often required, most international organizations aim at con-
sensus building and have those mechanisms in place in their constitutions and secondary law. 
Consensus however can cause delays, whereby competitors argue for their preferred solution or 
simply hold out until one side concedes or withdraws to the benefi t of the other. 20 Endorsement 
of a given standard at the end of the process can generate substantial rents which make the effort 
quite worthwhile, 21 but also confi rms the value of (and, in the end, legitimizes) the standard- 
setter as a stabilizing factor in its capacity as a coordinating authority. 
 In addition, it was shown that, in areas of rapid technological change and innovation and 
thus important rents being at stake (distributional confl icts), the standard- setting process may be 
slower in a consensus- based standard- setting body, but delays will be effi cient when the under-
lying technology improves with the time. Thus, and quite importantly, at the end of the lengthy 
process higher quality outcomes will be produced. 22 This means that, contrary to conventional 
belief, and somehow counter- intuitively, striving for consensus may have a very limited impact 
on the technical and scientifi c excellence of a given standard. However, when vested interests 
are strong, relaxing the way consensus is required or identifying a neutral participant to break 
deadlock (i.e. binding arbitration) may be preferable to increase the effectiveness of a given 
standard. 23 
 Due to the importance of standardization for businesses, substantial fi nancial resources 
are invested in standardization fora. 24 Indeed, an active participation in standardization activ-
ities is necessary to boost innovation, notably in case of highly competitive markets, but is also 
quite expensive. The increase of standards- related patent disputes, the emergence of industry- 
sponsored consortia, but also actions against allegedly anticompetitive practices within SSOs 
is indicative of the importance of standardization and the stakes at play, notably in high- tech 
areas. 25 
 In practice, not only competition among  fi rms to innovate and standardize but also compe-
tition among  standard- setting groups to attract such fi rms constitutes a typical feature of private 
standard- setting. Standard- setting groups compete on offering the most attractive institutional 
setting for the development and update of standards. What will many times determine the 
choice of forum (i.e. standard- setting body) is whether for a given fi rm the possibility to dictate 
a standard carries more weight in its standards- related behaviour than the reputation of a given 
standard- setting body, that is, whether reputation costs are lower than the benefi ts of dictating 
the standard in a second- best standard- setting scheme. This choice will essentially depend on 
the size of the market and the attractiveness of the technology. 26 The role of possibilities within a 
given SSO for addressing and resolving disagreements and potential confl icts, for instance, fl ex-
ible rules relating to participation or expedited mechanisms for solving disputes, may be equally 
crucial for the survival and continuous relevance of a particular SSO. 27 
 20  Farrell and Saloner fi rst described this tactic as a ‘war of attrition’, suggesting that it may lead to the technically best 
solution, but with a signifi cant delay.  See Farrell & Saloner  1988 , 235. 
 21  Rysman & Simcoe  2008 ,  1920 . 
 22  Simcoe  2012 , 305. 
 23  See Farrell & Simcoe  2012 . 
 24  See id. at 236– 38; see also the observation of the Advocate- General Campos Sanchez- Bordona in the recent  Elliott case 
before the CJEU that ‘[i] ndustry assumes the greater share of the costs of standardization’.  James Elliot Construction 
Ltd. (CJEU 2016, ¶ 58). 
 25  See Vol. 1;  see also Larouche & Van Overwalle  2015 . 
 26  Chiao et al.  2007 . 
 27  Delimatsis & Kanevskaia  2018 . 
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 As noted earlier, the stakes are quite high in standard- setting procedures and thus participants 
are self- interested agents who aim to extract the maximum rents. In this process, rents can be 
extracted, for example, when a particular technology is considered standard- essential or when 
a given legislation adopted by public bodies refers to a standard created within an SSO as a 
benchmark for compliance with law. One can easily identify a certain pattern in standardization 
activities and the incentives to participate therein. Even though standards are adopted mainly 
through soft- law processes by non- state actors, these actors aspire to capitalize on their success 
and see the initially non- binding norms they champion transformed into hard law to gain rents 
from fi rst mover advantages through expedited enforcement. 
 This constellation and modus operandi does not necessarily imply that inferior technologies 
will prevail thanks to strategic behaviour. On the contrary, more often than not, strategic behav-
iour and market power will still not bear fruit unless it is backed up by important technological 
strength. This result is typically due to the dynamic process that characterizes standardization 
and substantial investments on research and development (R&D). The standardization- related 
procedures may also often have the necessary safeguards or remedies in place to avoid blatant 
negligence against the best available technology. 28 This would suggest that procedures within 
SSOs should be continuously reviewed to ensure that distortions of this type are duly addressed 
and avoided. Thus, standard- setting bodies are important coordination devices. 
 The stakeholders involved in international standardization are of hybrid nature and, like self- 
regulators, have a confl ict of interest inherent in their functions:  they are there to serve the 
interests of their constituents but also the national interest. 29 In many cases, domestic industries 
are so deeply convinced of the superiority of their standards that they believe they promote the 
public interest – along with their own – when they strive for the application of standards which 
actually refl ect characteristics of their own standards. At this level, industry representatives and 
SSBs participating in the international standard- setting process become the missionaries who 
convey a strikingly paradoxical message of globalization: as we move towards closer integration 
and interdependence at a global level, 30 societies may prove to be less prepared to abandon 
long- established practices and important values that have shaped their lives for decades or even 
centuries. The result is that when they discuss and negotiate in a globalized context, they tend 
to defend fi ercely or to attempt to impose their domestic preferences and values. 
 This probably explains why creating globalized standards or achieving harmonization of 
technical regulations is a utopian ideal in the short run. 31 Thus, the formula ‘1+1+1’, that is, 
‘one standard, one test and one conformity assessment procedure accepted everywhere’ is not 
realistic. Without the necessary procedural guarantees in place, the benefi cial effects of stand-
ardization can be undermined if standardization cannot resist market power nor has the insti-
tutional sensitivity and accommodating structures to take into account the views of smaller 
market players or important societal values. 32 Thus, several international SSOs have taken steps 
to ensure effective participation, including the ability to attend meetings through electronic 
means; the disclosure of all minutes of the meetings; the possibility for partnerships with more 
advanced participants and the like. 
 28  For certain problematic features of the remedies system within the ISO, see Delimatsis ( 2018 ). 
 29  See, e.g. , US Trade Agreements Act of  1979 (providing that the representation of US interests before any private inter-
national standards organization shall be carried out by the organization member, defi ned as ‘the private person who 
holds membership in a private international standards organization’).  See also Schepel  2011 , 404. 
 30  Lazer  2001 . 
 31  Sykes  1999 . 
 32  Abbott & Snidal  2001 ;  see also European Commission  2011a , 11ff. 
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 B.  THE TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS UNDER 
THE TBT AGREEMENT 
 The impressive reduction of tariffs since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in the late 1940s and the outright prohibition of the use of quantitative 
restrictions that the GATT requires has a led to the use by WTO Members of ‘behind- the- 
border’, domestic instruments to protect their industries. 33 These non- tariff barriers (NTBs) have 
ultimately emerged as persistent trade barriers. 34 To make things worse from a market access 
standpoint, rules, specifi cations, standards and other documents with some normative content 
created by non- state actors regularly impinge on economic action. Thus, delegation of regula-
tory power to private actors and the rise of private government and transnational networks are 
not unproblematic from an international law viewpoint, as these activities may fall outside the 
scope of traditional inter- state rules. 35 
 The GATT is a negative integration contract. It is essentially based on one obligation which 
is imposed on the WTO Membership: every domestic policy that impacts on trade has to be 
applied in a non- discriminatory manner, thereby ensuring equality of opportunities between 
domestic and foreign products, but also among foreign products only. On the other hand, pol-
icies affecting trade are to be unilaterally prescribed at a national level and thus there is no pre-
defi ned set of policies by which all WTO Members must abide. This means, inter alia, that the 
GATT does not imply any compulsory adherence to international standards. 
 However, with the adoption of the TBT in the mid- 90s and the establishment of the WTO, 
the WTO drafters decided to go beyond non- discrimination to promote regulatory effi ciency 
domestically in areas such as technical or food safety regulations. 36 As we will see below, this 
shift of focus inevitably included voluntary international standards as expressions of inter-
national technical consensus developed in international SSOs such as the ISO or the Codex 
Alimentarius. With this change in the multilateral trading system, the processes used within 
international SSOs, neglected by many up to that point in time, came to the forefront, leading 
to ensuing transformations of their modus operandi. 37 
 1.  Referencing International Standards in the TBT Preamble 
 The TBT substantiates Members’ attempt to effectively deal with NTBs and harness badly 
designed and badly applied technical regulations, specifi cations, standards and procedures 
domestically. However, it also acknowledges Members’ prerogative to autonomously pursue 
public policy objectives such as those relating to the protection of the environment or con-
sumers, provided that the non- discrimination principle is observed. 38 Early on in its preamble, 
the TBT points to the importance of harmonization of compatibility standards by acknowledging 
the role of international standards as trade facilitators and technology transfer vectors. In other 
words, the TBT encourages the development of such harmonized standards at the international 
 33  Kono  2006 (showing that democratic regimes have asymmetrical infl uence over the various types of protection, i.e. 
while leading to lower tariffs, they lead to higher NTBs). 
 34  Wilson  2002 . 
 35  See, e.g. , Donnelly  2007 . 
 36  See Marceau & Trachtman  2002 ; Howse & Langille  2012 . 
 37  For instance, Motaal ( 2004 ) unequivocally describes the transformation that international SSOs, which prepare, draft 
and adopt SPS standards, have undergone since 1994 due to the entry into force of the  SPS Agreement at the conclu-
sion of the Uruguay Round. 
 38  See also WTO  2015 , para. 213. 
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level. The TBT explicitly refers to international standardization as a highly relevant process for 
addressing technical barriers to trade, thereby endorsing by reference the importance of the 
work of several decades done within international SSOs to advance technological progress. The 
fact that the TBT, contrary to the SPS, does not explicitly refer to particular international SSOs 
does not alter this observation. 
 Thus, both the TBT and the SPS make a rather considerate choice in favour of international 
standards. If one is to strike a reasonable balance between concealed protectionism and the 
well- meant pursuit of legitimate objectives by a benign government, benchmarks (or proxies) 
are needed. Under the GATT, the necessity test of the general exceptions provision enshrined 
in Article XX GATT exerts this role, 39 allowing to identify measures that exceed what is neces-
sary to achieve the degree of contribution that a given measure makes to the pursuit of a 
legitimate objective. 40 A necessity test as a proxy in the case of the TBT and the SPS would 
be necessary (and indeed such a test is to be found in both agreements), but it is not suffi -
cient for a treaty that aims at  positive integration through harmonization. Additional common 
denominators or heuristic devices are needed. Due to their unambiguous technical expertise, 
international SSOs and the instruments they create, i.e. international standards, are deemed 
appropriate for this role. 
 At the same time, and perhaps contrary to the mainstream literature about TBT, 41 there is 
no  carte blanche for international standard- setting processes enshrined in the TBT preamble. 
Rather the approach is much more critical when one looks carefully at the preamble. Indeed, 
the TBT preamble, after hailing the importance of harmonizing international standards and 
conformity assessment systems, refers to Members’ desire to ensure that technical regulations 
and standards do not create unnecessary trade barriers. Arguably, this relates not only to domestic 
measures but also to international standards. This interpretation is reasonable due to the use of 
the word ‘however’ in the fi fth recital of the TBT preamble. It is only plausible to suggest here 
that ‘however’ refers to what preceded under the third and fourth recitals, which exclusively 
refer to  international instruments. 
 2.  The Substantive Scope of TBT: The Distinction Between a Technical 
Regulation and a Standard 
 Rationae materiae , the TBT distinguishes between technical regulations and standards. More 
specifi cally, it covers mandatory technical regulations and voluntary product standards (such 
as those relating to size, quality, composition, or labelling) as well as conformity assessment 
procedures. Despite the reference to ISO/ IEC Guide 2:1991, which was subsequently revised 
within ISO, the TBT offers defi nitions for the three main categories of measures coming under 
the TBT ambit in Annex 1 of the agreement. For our purposes, we will focus on the fi rst two 
categories. Thus, a technical regulation is defi ned as a:
 [d] ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and produc-
tion methods,  including the applicable administrative provisions , with which  compliance 
is mandatory . It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. 
(emphasis added) 
 39  See Delimatsis  2011 . 
 40  Cf. WTO  2015 , para. 319. 
 41  See, e.g. , Appleton  2005 . 
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 Furthermore, it defi nes a standard as a: 42 
 [d] ocument  approved by a recognized body , that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which  compliance is not mandatory . It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method. (emphasis added) 
 The two defi nitions overlap already in their very wording. More strikingly, the second sentence 
in both defi nitions is identical. Importantly, both defi nitions make clear that they cover labelling 
requirements and production and process methods (PPMs). After the Appellate Body decision 
in  EC – Sardines , the traditional view that allowed drawing the line between the two categories 
of products was whether non- compliance with a given measure in fact prohibits access to a given 
market (technical regulation) or whether access to a given market was possible irrespective of 
compliance with a given specifi cation (standards). 43 
 The Appellate Body examined the constitutive elements of a technical regulation under the 
TBT in  EC – Asbestos and  EC – Sardines , and, more recently, in  EC – Seal Products . First, it 
found that a technical regulation may lay down one or more  binding product characteristics 
in a  positive or  negative form, i.e. it may require that a product possesses (or not) particular 
characteristics. Thus, the document at stake must have a certain normative content. 44 According 
to the Appellate Body, this includes any objectively defi nable features, qualities, attributes, or 
other distinguishable mark of a product. Those product characteristics may be intrinsic or they 
may be related to the product such as the means of identifi cation, the presentation and the 
appearance of a product. 45 Additionally, it should be applicable to an identifi able product or 
group of products. Finally, compliance is mandatory, suggesting that non- compliance would 
allow an enforcement mechanism to sanction a particular producer. 46 
 In  EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body found that compliance with the relevant EC Regulation 
was mandatory because the legislative instrument used was binding and directly applicable in 
all EU Member States. In view of the many similarities among the defi nition of technical regu-
lation and that of a standard, two appear to be the main differences between the two types of 
measures: the fi rst is that, whereas the technical regulation is adopted by a governmental body 
and thus is a State measure, a standard is typically issued by private or semi- private standardizing 
bodies, that is, bodies with standardization activities. A standard can later become a technical 
regulation if adopted or used as a basis for a legislative act by the State. The second difference is 
that, unlike a technical regulation, compliance with a standard is voluntary. 
 3.  TBT Basics Revisited: Blurring the Distinction Between Technical Regulations 
and Standards 
 The actual contours of the defi nition of a technical regulation and its relationship with the def-
inition of a standard under the TBT was more recently discussed in the controversial  US – Tuna 
II dispute relating to a dolphin- safe labelling scheme for tuna products. 47 Under the measure 
 42  For the negotiating history of this defi nition, see TBT Committee ( 1995 ). 
 43  Cf. Van den Bossche  2008 . As discussed below, the Appellate Body decoupled the two in  US – Tuna II .  See WTO 
 2015 , para. 196. 
 44  WTO  2014 , para. 5.10. 
 45  WTO  2001 , para. 67. 
 46  See WTO  2001 , para. 76; WTO  2002a , para. 176. 
 47  See also Mavroidis  2013 . 
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at issue, tuna products sold in the United States could be labelled ‘dolphin- safe’ only if certain 
requirements were met, in particular with respect to the way tuna was harvested. Crucially, for 
tuna to be imported, no ‘dolphin- safe’ label was required. 
 The Panel fi rst and the Appellate Body at the last instance found that the measure at issue was 
a technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1 TBT. Both considered that whether the 
measure at issue was imposing conditions on the access to the ‘dolphin- safe’ label rather than 
the US market as a whole was important and indeed decisive in this respect. A critical element 
in this case appears to have been that the US measure covered the ‘entire fi eld’ of what ‘dolphin- 
safe’ meant in relation to tuna products in the United States. 48 In the Appellate Body’s words: 49 
 In effect, the measure at issue establishes a single defi nition of ‘dolphin- safe’ and treats any 
statement on a tuna product regarding ‘dolphin- safety’ that does not meet the conditions of the 
measure as a deceptive practice or act. 
 After observing that the measure at issue consisted of US federal legislative and regulatory acts 
and that included administrative provisions, the Appellate Body found that the ‘dolphin- safe’ 
labelling requirement was a technical regulation for the purposes of the TBT. 
 Arguably, the analyses of the Panel and the Appellate Body are not convincing 50 and makes 
much of Annex 1.2 TBT superfl uous by blurring the distinction between mandatory and volun-
tary compliance. More fundamentally, it deprives Annex 1.2 TBT of its  effet utile , rendering it 
redundant. Systemically, it may have signifi cant repercussions for various sustainability- related 
labelling schemes, organized and applied by both governmental or hybrid and private standard-
izing bodies. This is particularly so in cases where: (i) no governmental scheme is present in 
the market and (ii) some connection with the government or administrative guidance can be 
proven, thereby linking the standardization body with the State. If none of the two happens, then 
only a very marginal set of rules could come within the defi nition of a standard under Annex 
1.2 TBT, taking into account the similarity of the second sentence of Annex 1.1 and 1.2 TBT. 51 
 It is submitted that both the Panel and the Appellate Body failed to give meaning to the fact 
that the US measure was not concerned with setting characteristics for a product to be regarded 
as tuna. Rather, the measure at issue set the traits of  dolphin- safe tuna products. Tuna products, 
no matter how they were harvested, could still enter the US market. Both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body invoked  EC – Sardines to corroborate their fi ndings. However, they both seemed 
to neglect a fundamental difference between the two cases:  the EC regulation allowed only 
one particular species of sardines to be marketed as preserved sardines within the EU. Thus, 
it was clear that no other sardines could enter the market with the label ‘preserved sardines’. 
Nevertheless, in  US – Tuna II , traders were free to access the tuna market without any labels 
relating to their ‘dolphin safety’. Note, in stark contrast, that in  EC – Sardines , Peruvian sardines 
could not enter the EU market. In the facts of  US – Tuna II , though, tuna products could still 
be marketed and sold as ordinary tuna even if they do not comply with the ‘dolphin- safe’ label-
ling requirements. 52 Thus, the WTO judiciary confl ated the requirements for access to the  label 
 48  See WTO  2015 , para. 193. 
 49  Id. at para. 195. 
 50  Note that one of the panelists in the panel stage fi led a separate opinion on this particular matter.  See WTO  2011b , 
para. 7.146ff. 
 51  Taking  US – Tuna II as an example, if the same dolphin- safe scheme was promulgated by a private standardizing 
body, then the scheme would have been classifi ed most likely as a standard and not a technical regulation. However, 
is it only the governmental involvement that determines whether we apply Annex 1.1 or 1.2 TBT? The focus on com-
pliance and exclusion of the market for a given product seems to be safer a criterion. 
 52  See also the EU arguments in WTO  2015 , para. 155; and the panelist’s dissenting opinion in WTO  2011b , para. 7.164. 
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with the requirements for access to the  market . In  US – Tuna II , it was at the discretion of the 
producer to comply or not with the requirements of the label. However, in  EC – Sardines , that 
was defi nitely not the case. 
 To show the problematic character of this interpretation, one can juxtapose it to the US 
measure that was at stake in the COOL dispute. In this case, the measure at issue imposed an 
obligation on retailers selling specifi c meat products in the US downstream market to label 
those products depending on their country of origin. 53 In this case, such products could not get 
to the fi nal point of sale without such label. If the  US – Tuna II interpretation holds, then the 
COOL measure and the ‘dolphin- safe’ label would be labelling systems producing the same 
effects. However, they clearly do not, as in the case of country of origin labelling for meat, 
the meat product would not be allowed to reach consumers unless such label is affi xed to the 
product. This result does not appear to hold a strict scrutiny of consistency. The  EC – Seal 
Products Appellate Body Report only comes to corroborate the argument made here. In this 
case, the Appellate Body underscored that the EU relevant legislation prescribes rules relating 
to the  placing on the EU market of seal products in a  binding fashion. 54 
 For the sake of comparison, long- established case law in the EU would suggest that a measure 
of this type would most likely survive the scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Indeed, not much can be said against the legality of the labelling scheme at issue when 
juxtaposed to the  Keck formula: the US measure applies to all relevant traders operating in the 
market and affects in the same manner, both in law and in fact, the selling of domestic products 
and of those from other Members. 55 
 From a systemic point of view, the WTO judiciary brought under the defi nition of technical 
regulation of the TBT non- incorporated PPMs, that is, PPMs that are not observable on the 
product itself. This may be a welcome development, as the WTO judiciary would like to keep 
thorough judicial review of such measures for itself. From a legal point of view, it confounds the 
different categories of TBT measures and, arguably in a broader sense, the balance among the 
WTO agreements. Indeed, in that case, a more apposite and case - law consistent interpretation 
of the facts should have led the WTO judiciary to fi nd that the TBT was not applicable and 
thus roll back to the application of Article III:4 GATT. However, one problematic feature of this 
option was that the Appellate Body would be unable to complete the analysis because the Panel 
exercised judicial economy with respect to the Mexican claims under the GATT, after fi nding 
that the TBT is  lex specialis and after making fi ndings under the latter agreement. 
 4.  The TBT Code of Good Practice Relating to Standards 
 The structure of the TBT reveals a hierarchical relationship between the two types of instruments 
we discussed earlier. Whereas the obligations for technical regulations are in the main body of 
the TBT, the obligations regarding the development, adoption and application of standards 
are to be found in Annex 3 incorporating a Code of Good Practice (hereinafter ‘the Code’). 
This is in stark contrast with the previous, plurilateral Standards Code adopted in the Tokyo 
Round where rules for technical regulations and standards belonged to the main body of the 
agreement without differentiation between the two categories of measures. On substance, this 
does not make the provisions relating to standards any less binding, as the Annex is an integral 
 53  See WTO  2012a , para. 239. 
 54  WTO  2014 , para. 5.22. 
 55  See Keck and Mithouard (CJEU 1993), para. 16. 
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part of the TBT by virtue of Article 15.5 TBT. More importantly, the obligations under the Code 
relating to standards and Article 2 regarding technical regulations are for all practical purposes 
the same, thereby minimizing the importance of locating the obligations for the two main TBT 
instruments in two different places. 
 Having said this, it appears that the Code is not incorporated in the TBT but in a separate annex 
because the Code includes obligations that are mainly addressed to self- regulated and - governed 
national standard- setting bodies, whereby many of those bodies, as noted earlier, are private 
bodies composed of industry representatives. For this reason, the TBT foresees the possibility 
for the Code to be accepted by standardizing bodies, be it governmental or non- governmental; 
central, regional or local – established in the territory of any WTO Member. Indeed, the Code 
is open for acceptance and the ISO/ IEC Information Centre keeps track of such acceptances. 56 
As of February 2016, 174 standard- setting bodies from 128 WTO Members accepted the Code; 
among them there are 96 central government bodies, 67 non- governmental bodies, three statu-
tory bodies, two parastatal bodies, three non- governmental regional bodies (the three European 
standard- setters, i.e. CEN, CENELEC and ETSI), one central hybrid body, one central gov-
ernmental/ local body and one autonomous body. 57 While the acceptance of the Code generates 
important signalling effects, Article 4 TBT provides that Members’ obligations relating to com-
pliance of domestic standard- setting bodies with the Code remain intact regardless of whether a 
domestic standard- setting body has accepted the Code. 
 Even if this serves consistency, some interpretive challenges remain. For instance, paragraph 
D of the Code requires that standardizing bodies accord equal treatment to foreign products 
when compared to other foreign or domestic products. Nevertheless, this obligation seems to 
be without content, for such bodies do not deal with products directly. Taking into account the 
work that typically SSOs deal with, it appears illogical to require from SSOs the type of non- 
discrimination that the TBT and WTO law in general requires from States. Rather, one would 
expect the Code to focus on fair and non- discriminatory access to standardization activities, par-
ticipation, transparency, necessity and the like. For the sake of comparison and as an example of 
how non- discrimination could be phrased adequately, Article 5.5 of ISO/ IEC Guide 59 of 1994 
provides that standards shall neither be written nor adopted so as to discriminate among products 
on the basis of the place of origin. 58 Another example of this kind is to be found in Article 5.5.3 of 
the ISEAL Alliance Code of Good Practice which requires that membership criteria and appli-
cation procedures in standard- setting organizations be transparent and non- discriminatory. 59 
 While not explicitly referring to the relationship between the TBT and ISO, the former has 
numerous references to the ISO, more particularly ISO/ IEC Guide 2: 1991. The TBT provides 
that whenever terms that are included in this Guide are also mentioned in the TBT, then the 
meaning that these terms have according to the Guide becomes the authoritative one. 60 Thus, 
the ISO/ IEC Guide 2:1991 constitutes important context for dispute settlement purposes by 
virtue of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), directing the judiciary to 
have recourse to a non- WTO document to clarify certain TBT terms. 61 Together with Article 
 56  See Memorandum of Understanding on ‘WTO Standards Information Service Operated by ISO’. Every standard-
ization body that accepted the Code is obliged to prepare a biannual work program in which it provides information 
about the standards under preparation and the standards that it adopted in the preceding period. 
 57  See TBT Committee  2016 . 
 58  See TBT Committee  1993 . 
 59  See ISEAL Alliance  2010 . 
 60  See WTO  1995 , Annex 1, introductory paragraph. 
 61  Similar to the Harmonised System’s explanatory notes.  See, e.g. , WTO  2008a , paras. 149ff. 
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1.1 TBT, they substantiate the attempt of the TBT drafters to position the agreement within the 
broader standardization community and to relate it to the existing international standard- setting 
processes in a positive manner. In addition, the Code reproduces principles and rules known 
from the ISO without however explicitly referring to it. For instance, paragraph G of the Code 
provides that national standard- setting bodies shall strive to be represented in international SSOs 
through one delegation to ensure coherence (national delegation principle). 
 5.  Unfolding the conundrum of ‘relevant international standards’ 
 The idea of favouring global convergence of technical regulations permeates the TBT. 62 Article 
2.4 requires that  relevant international standards or  relevant parts thereof (when they exist or are 
about to be adopted) be used as  a basis for domestic technical regulations unless they are ineffective 
or inappropriate means for meeting the public policy objectives pursued. No grandfathering was 
allowed at the moment of adopting the agreement. In  EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body confi rmed 
that this obligation applies not only to technical regulations that were adopted after the entry into 
force of the WTO agreement, but also to technical regulations that already existed before the entry 
into force of the TBT but continued to produce effects. 63 
 Standards would be subject to a similar obligation. This means that a series of international 
standards that were adopted before the mid- 90s and typically applied on a voluntary basis sud-
denly become mandatory reference points for domestic technical regulations. Thus, interest in 
international standard- setting activities as a gateway to infl uence the normative contents of the 
benchmarks potentially used in future WTO adjudication was also revived as a result. 
 In  EC  – Sardines , the concept ‘as a basis for’ was interpreted to mean that an international 
standard is used in this way when it is the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the 
purpose of enacting the technical regulation at stake, thereby revealing a very strong and close rela-
tionship between the two. 64 If only parts of a given international standard are used, then those that 
are relevant shall be used as a basis for the technical regulation at issue. At a minimum, the inter-
national standard and the regulation cannot contradict each other. 
 Finally, it bears noting that it is for the complaining party to prove that the international 
standard at issue is effective (capable of accomplishing the legitimate objective pursued) and 
appropriate (suitable for the fulfi lment of the objective pursued) for the achievement of the 
objective pursued. In this analysis it would be for the judiciary to examine and determine the 
legitimacy of the objectives of the measure. Effectiveness focuses on the  results of the means 
used, whereas appropriateness focused on the  nature of the means used. 65 Adjudicating bodies 
may be more willing to deny such qualities to international standards, for instance, when 
perceptions and expectations of consumers are not satisfi ed by it 66 or when the technical regu-
lation at issue sets higher standards (e.g. more detailed and accurate information) for consumer 
protection. 67 
 62  Other than standards, this is also obvious in the case of conformity asseessment procedures.  See, e.g. , WTO  1995 , 
Article 9. 
 63  WTO  2002a , para. 205. 
 64  Id. , paras. 244– 45. 
 65  Id., para. 285. 
 66  Id., para. 289. 
 67  See WTO  2011a , para. 7.734. This excerpt actually is one of the most striking ones in this Panel report. The Panel 
seems to examine indirectly, but still quite critically, the substantive content of the relevant international standard, 
leaving the window for the circumvention of international standards (a Codex standard in this case) wide open. In 
addition, the Panel appears to disregard the fact that one of the purposes of the Codex standard was indeed to protect 
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 Pursuant to Article 2.5 TBT, a technical regulation is presumed to comply with the TBT 
and more specifi cally Article 2.2, if it is in accordance with  relevant international standards and 
provided that is prepared, adopted or applied to protect national security; prevent deceptive 
practices; protect human and animal health or safety; or the environment. The rationale behind 
this ‘safe haven’ is that voluntary international standards ostensibly incorporate international 
preferences and unambiguous technical superiority. Furthermore, Article 2.9 provides for add-
itional notifi cation requirements in case relevant international standards are not used. 
 Thus, other than requiring Members to use relevant international standards in a positive 
manner and creating a rebuttable presumption of consistency as an extra ‘carrot’, the TBT 
imposes additional, burdensome conditions that Members need to comply with in case of 
neglecting international standards. In other words, in those areas where international standards 
exist, which, as noted earlier, are mainly of voluntary nature, they become the reference point 
and de facto mandatory normative technical material to be used by WTO Members. As a result, 
a mass of documents of at best uncertain legal normativity are transformed into international 
obligations equivalent to treaty text. 68 
 Article 2 TBT mentions various times the term ‘relevant international standard’ but lacks any 
provision that would offer a defi nition. This is in stark contrast to the importance of this exer-
cise. 69 We mentioned earlier the TBT defi nition of a standard. The ISO/ IEC Guide 2:2004, on 
the other hand, defi nes a standard as a
 document, established by  consensus and approved by a  recognized body, that provides for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, 
aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context. 
 Note: Standards should be based on the consolidated results of science technology and experi-
ence, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefi ts. 70 (emphasis added) 
 Furthermore, and quite tautologically, the Guide defi nes as international a standard that is 
adopted by an international standardizing/ standards organization and made available to the 
public. 71 Later on, the ISO/ IEC Guide defi nes an international standardizing organization as 
the organization (that is, the body that is based in the membership of other bodies or individuals 
and has an  established constitution and its own administration ) whose membership is open to the 
relevant national body from every country. 72 This seems to suggest that an international standard 
is not any different from a national standard in terms of  content . Common and repeated use 
as well as fi tness for purpose are important traits for both of them. What rather makes it dis-
tinct is the  nature of the body preparing and adopting it, i.e. the  international standardizing 
organization. 73 
consumers from unduly confusing and detailed information. Thus, both the international standard and the domestic 
labelling scheme pursued the same legitimate objective. Why then opt for the domestic standard when the actual 
objective of the TBT is convergence and harmonization through the use of  international standards? Interestingly, it 
would seem to suggest that the international standard may not have been ‘relevant’ in the fi rst place. Unfortunately, 
the Panel’s fi ndings in this respect were not appealed. 
 68  See also Howse  2006 , above n. 28, pg. 383. 
 69  Cf. WTO  2015 , para. 348. 
 70  See ISO/ IEC  2004 , Art. 3.2. 
 71  Echoed in the EU Regulation 1025/ 2012, Art. 2(1)(a). Both documents avoid the question as to whether such 
documents should be made available to the public for free. The latter would go against the SSOs’ current business 
model whereby standards are documents for sale to interested parties and economic operators. 
 72  See ISO/ IEC  2004 , Art. 4.3.2., in conjunction with Art. 4.2. 
 73  Compare the distinction between international, European and national standard in the EU Regulation 1025/ 2012, 
Article 2(1) (a), (b) and (d). 
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 These defi nitions are important and relevant for the purposes of TBT interpretation, 
because the introductory paragraph of Annex 1 TBT provides that terms used in it that remain 
undefi ned in the TBT should have the same meaning as in the ISO/ IEC Guide 2:1991. 74 
Thus, in reconstructing the defi nition of a relevant  international standard for TBT purposes, 
one would need to take elements from both the TBT defi nitions and the ISO/ IEC Guide’s 
defi nitions. 75 
 While not offering an explicit defi nition of what constitutes an international standard, the 
TBT defi nition of standard in Annex 1.2 TBT also deviates from the ISO defi nition in that 
it also considers as standards for TBT purposes those documents that are not based on con-
sensus. This is a considerate deviation, 76 as the explanatory note in Annex 1.2 TBT is clear 
on the TBT drafters’ awareness of the fact that international standards are typically based on 
consensus. 
 Thus, in  EC – Sardines , the Panel fi rst and the Appellate Body later rejected the EU’s argu-
ment that only standards adopted by consensus can be regarded as relevant for purposes of 
Article 2.4 TBT. The EU, in this case, suggested that a standard such as the Codex Stan 94 
which is accepted by only 18 countries, of which only four accepted it fully, cannot be regarded 
as an international standard. 77 Interestingly, in order to answer the EU’s claim regarding the rele-
vance of the Codex Alimentarius standard, i.e. an  international standard, the Appellate Body 
had recourse to the generic defi nition of standard enshrined in the last two sentences of the 
explanatory note of Annex 1.2 TBT. This is an ambiguous interpretive technique to construct a 
defi nition by using elements from another defi nition and can be problematic: arguably, this has 
been the case here as well. 
 A careful reading of the explanatory note allows two different interpretations which seem to 
be equally plausible. The Panel and Appellate Body in  EC – Sardines found that the word ‘also’ 
in the last sentence makes clear that the word ‘document’ in the same sentence can only refer 
to international standards. However, a reading leading to the opposite outcome is equally pos-
sible: the explanatory note serves the role of  concretizing the generic term of standard enclosed 
in Annex 1.2 TBT and not international standards. 
 The note refers to the two general traits of standards: their voluntary character and the method 
of adopting them (consensus). However, even if the one before last sentence refers to the inter-
national standardization community, this does not change the fact that the Note is there to 
give fl esh to the  generic defi nition of standards for TBT purposes. In this respect, it is no coin-
cidence that the Appellate Body was quite reluctant in  US – Tuna II to revisit the analysis in 
 EC – Sardines . 78 
 The interpretation suggested here would have an important repercussion:  if the last two 
sentences of the explanatory note are to be read independently, then international standards 
 not adopted by consensus would not benefi t from the presumption of Article 2.5 TBT. Not only 
would such an interpretation be in consistency with the letter and spirit of the agreement; it 
would also, quite importantly, be an interpretation that fully respects and takes into account the 
peculiarities of the international standardization world. 
 74  Note that the relevant defi nitions of the ISO/ IEC Guide 2 : 1991 have remained identical in the ISO/ IEC Guide 
2: 2004. 
 75  Recall that the TBT defi nition of standard prevails over the ISO one as per WTO ( 1995 , Annex 1.2). 
 76  Cf. WTO  2002b , para. 225. 
 77  See id. at para. 4.33. 
 78  Cf. WTO 2015, para. 353. 
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 6.  Recognized International Standardization Bodies 
 Even so, interpretive challenges remain. For instance, which bodies are ‘recognized standard-
ization bodies’? Which among them constitute the ‘international standardization community’? 
The TBT refers to ‘relevant international standardizing bodies’ in the Code with particular ease, 
as if it was clearly defi ned and identifi ed. 79 
 Contrary to the TBT, the SPS explicitly recognizes the international SSOs that should be 
deemed as relevant points of reference: the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Offi ce of Epizootics (OIE); and the International Plant Protection Convention. 80 Even if the 
list is not exhaustive, it covers the most important international SSOs in the area of sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues. Importantly, all these bodies are intergovernmental organizations. 
 The TBT, in turn, does not have a similar provision, although one could plausibly argue that 
at least the ISO and IEC should be the fi rst bodies to be regarded as having recognized activ-
ities in the area of technical standardization. A fundamental difference between the two areas 
of standardization is that technical standardization is in principle of private nature, organized 
within associations of bodies rather than intergovernmental organizations, as we explained 
earlier. Thus, any explicit reference to or incorporation of normative work done in an essentially 
private body would lie uncomfortably within an otherwise State- to- State international contract. 81 
 The peculiar nature of technical standardization is also implicitly acknowledged in the 
TBT defi nition of standard. A TBT standard is typically adopted by a body, be it international, 
regional or central government one. In turn, the ISO/ IEC Guide defi nes a body as a legal or 
administrative entity that has specifi c tasks and composition. 82 
 Obviously, the many references to the ISO would seem to suggest that this non- governmental 
federation of national standards bodies belongs to the international standardization community 
and thus its standards are international. The same would most likely apply to IEC. Yet, other 
international standard- setting bodies exist as well. The Annex 1.4 TBT, consistent with the WTO 
legacy, defi nes international bodies in an open- ended manner; international are those bodies 
or systems whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of all Members. This is largely in 
line with the ISO/ IEC Guide defi nition of an international standardizing organization. Thus a 
regional body which is open to only some of the Members would not fall within this defi nition. 
 79  WTO  1995 , Annex 3, parass G and H. 
 80  WTO  1994c , Annex A.3. 
 81  In  dicta, the Appellate Body in WTO ( 2015 ) noted that, by not expressly referring to particular international SSOs, 
the TBT aims to encourage the development of international standards by bodies that were not already engaged in 
standardizing activities in the time of the entry into force of the TBT. This statement has a twofold meaning: fi rst, it 
makes clear the Appellate Body’s willingness to be open to assessing the capacity of new international SSOs to create 
relevant international standards within the meaning of WTO ( 1995 , Art. 2.4) and thus benefi t from the presumption 
of TBT consistency, which arguably would increase their legitimacy within the international standardization com-
munity and the multilateral trading system. Second, the Apppellate Body reminds us that such a recognition has a 
price, as it may be dependant on the standardizing body at issue showing that it meets the high due process criteria of 
the TBT Committee Decision (see  infra ). This is a responsibility  shared by international SSOs and WTO Members 
participating therein. In acknowledging some ‘bite’ to an otherwise best- endeavour TBT provision relating to special 
and differential treatment (S&DT), the Appellate Body clarifi es its intention in the future to make WTO Members 
accountable for their sincere efforts to ensure that international SSOs are organized and operated in a manner that 
ensures representative participation, taking the particularities of the developing countries into account.  See WTO 
 2015 , para. 379 and n. 745. 
 82  See also WTO  2011b , para. 7.679. To show the diversity of bodies that can come under this defi nition, the ISO/ IEC 
Guide provides that a body can be, for instance, an organization, an authority, a company or even a foundation. Thus, 
organizations can also be bodies, but the defi nition of organization under the ISO/ IEC Guide is narrow.  See ISO/ IEC 
 2004 , Art. 4.2. This however is not always straightforward. For instance, in  US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body seems to 
have misread this.  See WTO  2015 , para. 356. 
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If, however, membership to this body is not a priori excluded vis- à - vis a particular Member 
or its relevant standardizing body, then under certain circumstances its standards may still be 
regarded as international standards for TBT purposes. 
 For this to happen, the body would need to be a recognized one. This is reminiscent of 
Article 4.3 of the ISO/ IEC Guide 2:2004 which defi nes as standardizing those bodies that have 
‘recognized activities’ in standardization. 83 However, the Guide does not specify what recognized 
activities in standardization would mean and who should recognize such activities – and the 
same goes for the TBT. At the same time, the Guide does specify that standardization is the 
activity of establishing provisions for common and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of 
the optimum degree of order in a given context, more particularly the activity of preparing and 
implementing standards. It also makes clear that a recognized body in this area can be a body 
that, among other rules, also promulgates standards (standardizing body), but also a body whose 
main function is, pursuant to its statutes, the preparation, approval or adoption of standards that 
are publicly available (standards body). 84 The former category is broader and it is probably no 
coincidence that the Code uses this broad term to also cover bodies that incidentally develop 
standards. 
 However, with respect to ‘recognition’, neither the Guide nor the TBT establish a quantita-
tive benchmark. For instance, can a Member invoke as a defence against a standard that, for 
instance, its relevant body did not participate in the standardization activities of a given body or 
that, even if it participated, it objected or voted against that standard? Taking into account that 
consensus does not imply unanimity in the international standardization community, a critical 
mass of negative votes would be needed to raise doubts against the international character of a 
standard adopted within this setting. 
 In  US – Tuna II , the Appellate Body dealt with the meaning of ‘recognition’. It fi rst found that 
recognition implies that Members know, or at least expect that the international body at stake is 
active in standardization. Furthermore, recognition would be an issue to examine on a case- by- 
case basis, examining evidence of recognition by Members and/ or standardizing bodies at the 
regional, national or sub- national level. Thus, the Appellate Body avoided establishing a general 
test which would imply a  de minimis rule for recognition, other than noting that ‘the larger the 
number of countries that participate in the development of a standard, the more likely it can be 
said that the respective body’s activities in standardization are “recognized” ’. 85 
 Thus, it was made clear that recognition by WTO Members, rather than the standardization 
community (its ‘peers’) would cover a broad part of the scope of recognition within the meaning 
of Annex 1.2 TBT. However, bodies having developed a single standard would not come out-
side the scope of the TBT, simply due to the fact that they do not have extensive standardiza-
tion activities. Elements such as wide participation of WTO Members in the development of 
the standard; wide recognition of the validity and legality of the single standard; or adherence 
to the TBT Committee Decision of 2000 on principles for the development of international 
standards (the ‘TBT Committee Decision’) 86 would reveal a body with recognized activities in 
standardization. 87 
 83  In  US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body found that the ISO denifi tion of a standardizing body should assist in the inter-
pretation of the TBT term ‘recognized body’.  See WTO  2015 . 
 84  ISO/ IEC  2004 , Arts. 4.3 and 4.4. 
 85  WTO  2015 , para. 390. 
 86  See TBT Committee  2000 , para. 20 and Annex 4. 
 87  See WTO  2015 , para. 394. 
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 In this respect, an important argument was brought forward by Canada: Canada suggested 
that a recognition of activities of an international standardizing body cannot be assessed inde-
pendently of the TBT Committee Decision of 2000 on principles for the development of 
international standards (the ‘TBT Committee Decision’). 88 Put differently, an international 
standardizing body is ‘recognized’ if it develops standards or engages in standardizing activ-
ities in accordance with certain recognized principles such as those developed in the TBT 
Committee Decision. The Appellate Body correctly agreed that evidence about adherence to 
the TBT Committee Decision would be relevant for determining whether the body at issue has 
recognized activities. 89 It is to the TBT Committee Decision that we now turn. 
 7.  The TBT Committee Decision 
 Article 2.4 TBT appears to endorse international standards and international SSOs without any 
meaningful qualifi cations or conditions. It essentially transforms voluntary standards into de 
facto mandatory norms. This raises concerns regarding the way that such international standards 
are set and whether they indeed reveal international preferences and absolute technical super-
iority. Practice suggests that various standards fail to achieve this. In several instances, inter-
national standards were adopted with a narrow majority of the absolute number of votes and 
despite confl icting scientifi c opinions. 
 Take for instance the case of  EC – Sardines , as noted previously, where a small minority of 
Codex Members adopted the relevant Codex standard (18 out over 150 at the time). The same 
goes in the case of  EC – Hormones . The GMO standard is of course an SPS standard, but it 
is indicative of the concerns that international standardization may raise:  the relevant Codex 
standard was adopted with a very narrow majority of 33 votes to 29 with 7 abstentions. Indeed the 
TBT Agreement, as interpreted by the WTO adjudicating bodies, endorses standards adopted by 
international SSBs without examining their representativeness, comprehensiveness, or process 
of adoption. Can standards of this type be accepted as ‘international’ without running counter 
to any conceivable notion of fairness? 
 In 2000, the TBT Committee, which is responsible for the implementation of the TBT, 
adopted a decision during the TBT Second Triennial Review incorporating six principles and 
procedures that should be observed during the development of international standards. It was 
generally felt more input from a wider set of interests was needed in the international standard-
ization community. According to the dominant view, bodies operating with open, impartial and 
transparent procedures that afforded a fair opportunity for consensus among interested parties 
in all WTO Members would most likely prepare effective and relevant standards. 90 Clearly the 
TBT Committee Decision constituted a broader observation by WTO Members that rules and 
procedures within international SSOs needed to improve and strengthen. Clearly, it was an 
external call for reform of the international standardization community practices. 91 
 The principles identifi ed in the TBT Committee decision are:  transparency; openness; 
impartiality and consensus; effectiveness and relevance; coherence; and addressing the 
concerns of developing countries. In  EC  – Sardines , the EU alleged that the Codex 
 88  See TBT Committee  2000 , para. 20 and Annex 4. 
 89  See WTO  2015 , para. 376. 
 90  See TBT Committee  2001 , p. 12. 
 91  Cf. WTO  2015 , para. 371 and n. 736. 
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Alimentarius standard at issue was not a ‘relevant international standard’ because it was not 
adopted by consensus and thus was inconsistent with the principle of relevance laid down in 
this Decision. The Panel disagreed and stated that this Decision was not binding, but merely a 
‘policy statement of preference’, confi rming the WTO adjudicators’ unwillingness to examine 
with a critical eye the standards development process. The fi ndings remained unappealed for 
several years. 
 However, in the recent  US  – Tuna II decision, the Appellate Body found that the TBT 
Committee Decision constitutes a ‘subsequent agreement’ within the meaning of Article 31(3)
(a) VCLT and thus should be read together with the TBT when interpreting standards- related 
TBT provisions. 92 The Appellate Body was led to this conclusion based on various elements 
such as the fact that it was adopted by consensus; it bears specifi cally upon the interpretation 
and application of a TBT provision; and Members’ expressed intention to: (a) develop a better 
understanding of international standards within the TBT; (b) ensure the effective application of 
the TBT; and (c) clarify and strengthen the concept of international standards. 93 
 Indeed, agreements subsequent to the conclusion of a previous agreement aiming to specify 
how existing rules or obligations are to be applied (rather than to create new or extend existing 
obligations) can fall under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, constituting a further authentic element of 
interpretation to be taken into account along with context. 94 However, considering the TBT 
Committee Decision as ‘subsequent agreement’ barely squares with the  EC – Sardines previous 
fi nding that the last sentence of the Explanatory Note in Annex 1.2 TBT also relates to inter-
national standards. Quite crucially, if consensus should not be required for a standard to be 
regarded as a ‘relevant  international standard’, then the TBT Committee Decision, by requiring 
consensus, amounts to an  amendment of the TBT text. 95 
 After juxtaposing the Committee Decision principles to the standard that the Panel found 
to be a ‘relevant international standard’ within the meaning of the TBT, the Appellate Body 
reversed the Panel’s fi nding because the standard- setting body at issue was not open to at 
least all Members, as participation was possible by invitation only. In a clear message towards 
international SSOs, the Appellate Body found that standardization bodies must be open and 
 92  VCLT  1969 , Art. 31 ( General rule of interpretation ) provides: 
 1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 2.  The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: 
 (a)  any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclu-
sion of the treaty; 
 (b)  any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
 3.  There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 (a)  any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions ; (emphasis added) 
 93  WTO  2015 , paras 371– 72. 
 94  Cf. WTO  2008b , para. 391; and WTO  2012b , para. 265. 
 95  Interestingly, this goes against the letter and spirit of the WTO treaty. We fi nd contextual support in WTO ( 1994b , 
Article IX.2) prohibiting the abuse of the provision relating to authoritative interpretation to undermine the 
amendment provisions in WTO ( 1994b , Article X).  Cf. WTO  2008b , para. 383. By the same token, Decisions by 
WTO organs (such as the TBT Committee) cannot be used to circumvent the amendment provisions of the WTO. 
We believe that this is yet another indication that decoupling the last two sentences of the Explanatory Note so that 
its last sentence only refers to domestic and regional standard is the only reasonable interpretation of this provision. 
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transparent at every stage of standards development, thereby demonstrating the potential ‘bite’ 
of the WTO as an  ex post arbiter of the legitimacy of standards. 96 
 Tuna II should be assessed within its specifi c context: it was confi ned to a discussion of practices 
and institutional structures of a  regional standardizing body, whereas it discussed shortly only 
one out of the six principles identifi ed in the TBT Committee Decision. Even so,  Tuna II marks 
a shift from previous rulings where international standards were endorsed without examining 
under which procedural and substantive safeguards international SSOs had elaborated them. 
It demonstrates the WTO’s incipient determination to delve into the very essence of the inter-
national standardization processes. 
 Nevertheless, it is argued that the principles set out in the TBT Committee decision are not 
suffi ciently inclusive. From a normative point of view, for a standard to be regarded as a genu-
inely international standard, additional, but at the same time more concrete criteria may need 
to be developed to refl ect concerns about adequate levels of participation, transparency, coher-
ence and relevance. In this respect, a new and more comprehensive conceptual framework 
could be developed to assess the international character of international standards. 97 This new 
framework could be inspired from more recent work on good regulatory practices (including 
transparency, participation, deliberation, impact assessment and periodic review), development 
and sustainability. At the same time, however, any additional requirements or interference with 
the technical standardization world, notably when safety concerns may not be that apparent, 
would have to be fair and balanced so that dynamic effi ciency gains and innovation incentives 
continue to be in place to make sure that fair and non- discriminatory returns exist which allow 
for the innovation spiral to continue apace. 
 Conclusion 
 With its presumption of consistency when relevant international standards are used as a basis 
for domestic regulations, the TBT shows undue deference to the international standardization 
regimes. WTO cases where standards were used to defeat national regulatory autonomy have 
led to serious questions about the legitimacy of these regimes and their standards. By initially 
applying narrowly the TBT and the ensuing TBT Committee Decision, the WTO adjudicating 
bodies have legitimized certain standards which do not refl ect a critical mass of international 
preferences and thus should not be used as reference points or benchmarks because of certain 
defi ciencies identifi ed in the process of their adoption. 
 In what preceded, we showed that the erosion of State consent in international law and the 
transfer of power to technocrats can sometimes lead to absurd results which are in dire need of 
being mapped and addressed. International standard- setting is emblematic of such challenges. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that international standard- setters often behave as a de facto 
intractable club, excluding voices which increasingly seek to be heard in such fora. There are 
examples demonstrating the political imbalances that create distortions and elitist standards. 
However, demands for more openness and representativeness that come from emerging econ-
omies and other developing countries suggest that the current formation of regulatory- making in 
this arena refl ects anachronistic international geopolitics and can no longer hold. Power is now 
more equally distributed among the nations of the world. Such redistribution has to be refl ected 
 96  See WTO  2015 , para. 382. 
 97  See also ‘ “Relevant International Standards” and “Recognized Standardization Bodies” under the TBT Agreement’ 
in Delimatsis 2015. 
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within international organizations as well, notably those that may have substantial effects on the 
economic emancipation and welfare of a given country. At the same time, investment in R&D 
and innovation is a prerequisite if less advanced players want to benefi t from reformed standard- 
setting processes. To be sure, important IP- related issues would need to be part of the equation 
that strives to bring more equality in the ecology of international technical standardization. 
 US – Tuna II can herald a new era of more transparent and open international standard- 
setting. The jurisprudential shift towards more critical thinking about the activities of the 
international standardization community certainly affects international SSOs such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(CAC), which are interested in remaining relevant for the trade regulation regime. Additionally, 
their reputation may suffer if their standard- setting practices are found to lack legitimacy. 
 More empirical research is needed to develop analytical tools and heuristic devices which 
would objectively assess the mechanics of international standard- setting and, if needed, make 
the case for institutional reform within international SSOs with a view to increasing deliber-
ation, representativeness, openness, transparency, due process and accountability without 
jeopardizing economic progress and technological innovation. This possibility is not merely 
theoretical: arguably, the interpretation of the  COOL Panel as to when a standard constitutes 
an effective and appropriate means for achieving a legitimate objective may indeed go in that 
direction – a lock, stock and barrel interpretation of the message conveyed by the Appellate 
Body in  US – Tuna II . 
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